

SE-41

~~SECRET~~
SECURITY INFORMATION

1. The following conclusions of NIE-80: . . . are relevant to the consideration of Communist reactions to the suggested possible UN/US military courses of action:

"6. The Communists probably estimate that the Korean war exerts a divisive influence on the Western Powers and that at least during the period of this estimate the UN/US is unlikely to commit the military strength in the Far East necessary to drive the Communists from Korea. At the same time the Communists probably believe that the UN/US will take actions during the period of this estimate which will increase the costs and risks of the Korean war for the Communists.

"7. We believe that during the period of this estimate the Communists will seek to maintain strong military pressure in Korea while retaining a primarily defensive posture. At the same time, the Communists will continue to build up their military strength in the Korea-Manchuria area in order to be in a position to exploit any advantage which might develop or to counter possible UN/US intensification or expansion of the war.

"7a. We believe that so long as the military stalemate in Korea continues, the Communists are unlikely to make concessions on the POW issue to secure an armistice.

"7b. We believe that the Communist objective to gain control of all Korea will remain unchanged. We also believe, however, that the Communists desire to avoid general war over the Korean issue and that Communist courses of action in Korea will be determined by Communist global interests."

2. The following conclusion reached in SE-37 . . . is also relevant:

"6. . . We believe that a blockade and bombardment would not in itself induce the Communists to accept a Korean settlement on UN terms."

DOCUMENT NO. _____
NO CHANGE IN CLASS. ☐
☒ DECLASSIFIED
CLASS. CHANGED TO: TS S C
NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
DATE: 13 MARCH 81 REVIEWER: 018557

~~SECRET~~

3. Since the completion of SE-37 and NIE-80, the Communists have agreed in principle to the exchange of wounded and disabled prisoners of war, and have asked for a resumption of the armistice negotiations. Furthermore, the Soviet government has made several gestures which suggest a desire to relax the present tension between the Soviet Bloc and the West. As yet there is not sufficient evidence to estimate with confidence the meaning of the Soviet gestures or the Communist proposals regarding Korea. We believe, however, that they do not result either from fear of military defeat in Korea or from willingness of the new Soviet rulers to end the East-West struggle. However, the Communist proposals on Korea and the Soviet gestures may mean that the Soviet rulers desire a temporary relaxation of tension, possibly even including an armistice in Korea, during the period when they are consolidating their position in the Bloc. They may believe that such a relaxation would be desirable also as a means of weakening the resolution of the West and of dividing the US from its allies. Therefore, we believe it is possible -- though not probable -- that the desire to win a breathing spell and/or Soviet global policy may lead the Communists to conclude an armistice in Korea.

4. However, we believe that the following conclusions, based on the entire course of the fighting in Korea, remain valid so far as the Korean war in itself, apart from Soviet global strategy, is concerned:

- a. The Communists have demonstrated a willingness to continue the fighting at present or expanded levels in Korea.
- b. The Communists have avoided courses of action

~~SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

which would be likely to result in an expansion of the war beyond Korea or to entail grave risk of global war.

c. Political and economic conditions within North Korea and Communist China are not exerting compelling pressure on the Communists to conclude an armistice in Korea.

d. The Communist military potential in the Korean area has grown steadily since the initiation of cease-fire negotiations in mid-1951, and the enemy is now capable of launching a major ground and/or air attack with little or no warning.

5. We believe, therefore, that in response to the possible courses of action listed in the statement of the problem:

a. Possible course of action A would almost certainly not induce the Communists to conclude an armistice, but might encourage them to intensify their military pressure.

b. Possible course of action B would probably not induce the Communists to conclude an armistice or, in itself, lead to a change in Communist courses of action.

c. The remaining courses of action would probably be interpreted by the Communists as indicating a determination to force a military decision in Korea. The Communists would probably also conclude that failure to achieve the desired results by course of action C or course of action D would almost inevitably lead to the adoption of course of action E and then, if necessary, of course of action F. If, before the actual

~~TOP SECRET~~

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030010-5

TOP SECRET

Approved For Release 2000/04/17 : CIA-RDP79S01011A001000030010-5